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  OPINION 
_____________________           
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Before the Court are a set of cross-appeals from three 
separate orders issued by the District Court of the United 
States Virgin Islands.  Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the District 
Court dismissed three of the five counts of the defendants‘ 
counterclaim; the defendants appeal in part.  After discovery, 
the District Court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants as to the plaintiff‘s two federal claims; the 
plaintiff appeals in part.  The summary judgment order also 
dismissed without prejudice the plaintiff‘s remaining 
territorial-law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), on the 
ground that no federal causes of action remained in the case.  
A separate order filed a few days later sua sponte dismissed 
the defendants‘ two remaining territorial-law counterclaims 
for the same reason; the defendants appeal.  We will affirm 
the entry of summary judgment on the plaintiff‘s copyright 
claim, but will vacate the District Court‘s decisions 
dismissing the counterclaims.  
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I 
 Sarah Bunge and Thomas Friedberg (―the owners‖) 
wanted to build a home in the Virgin Islands. They 
approached Michael Milne, an architect who at the time was 
vice-president and director of the Virgin Islands architectural 
firm Village Vernacular, Inc.  While still a Village employee, 
Milne began work on the project.  The owners executed a 
letter of intent and paid a $1,000.00 deposit to hire Village on 
June 10, 1999.  Milne prepared a series of sketches and 
preliminary drawings for the project, and the owners paid 
another $6,650.00 to Village on October 5, 1999.  All the 
drawings and all of Milne‘s correspondence throughout 1999 
bore Village‘s imprint. In April 2000, Milne submitted 
conceptual drawings for the project to the Virgin Islands 
Department of Planning and Natural Resources, the local 
permitting body; these drawings were also marked with 
Village‘s legend. 
 Village was, however, in the process of getting out of 
the active practice of architecture, so Milne needed someplace 
else to ply his trade.  At some point in 1999 or 2000—the 
record contains no evidence of the exact date—Milne formed 
a second corporation, Barefoot Architect, Inc., where he 
continued his architecture practice and served as owner and 
president.  Bunge and Friedberg wanted to continue working 
with Milne, and on August 31, 2000 they entered into a 
standard American Institute of Architects (AIA) contract to 
engage Barefoot‘s architectural services.  The agreement calls 
for a contract price of $123,495.00 covering ―basic services,‖ 
a category defined in the contract‘s Article 2. The contract 
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also defines ―additional services,‖ which were to be billed at 
$85.00 per hour over and above the ―basic services‖ price. 
 By June 7, 2001, the owners had paid more than the 
entire ―basic services‖ price, but had yet to receive full 
construction drawings.  Barefoot nevertheless demanded that 
it be paid a further $281,698.43 for ―contingent additional 
services,‖ which it claims to have rendered on account of 
major changes to the project initiated by the owners.  Neither 
side was happy with this state of affairs; angry 
correspondence ensued.  The owners refused to pay for the 
―contingent additional services,‖ and on December 11, 2001, 
Milne sent them a letter on Barefoot letterhead stating that his 
firm was suspending its architectural services pursuant to 
subparagraph 8.1 of the contract.  The owners reacted by 
hiring Tracy Roberts of Springline Architects, LLC to replace 
Barefoot and to finish the project.   
Barefoot filed suit on July 27, 2004, alleging that 
Bunge, Friedberg, Roberts, and Springline had violated its 
copyright in the home design.  The complaint also asserted 
claims for violation of the Lanham Act and breach of 
contract.  In addition to an answer, the defendants filed five 
counterclaims: breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary 
duty, violation of the Lanham Act, and tortious interference 
with contractual relations.  Barefoot moved to dismiss the 
counterclaims, and on June 22, 2007 the District Court 
granted the motion as to the fraud, Lanham Act, and tortious 
interference claims, leaving the contract and fiduciary duty 
counterclaims intact.   
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On September 9, 2008—after the court‘s decision on 
the motion to dismiss—Barefoot and Village executed a 
―Memorandum of Transfer,‖ which purported to memorialize 
an October 5, 1999 oral transfer of the copyright to the 
project‘s design from Village to Barefoot.  Milne signed this 
memorandum on behalf of both firms (as Village‘s vice-
president and director, and as Barefoot‘s president); Glenn 
Speer, as Village‘s president, also signed on his firm‘s behalf. 
 The defendants then moved for summary judgment, 
which the District Court granted with respect to the Copyright 
Act and Lanham Act claims.  The court proceeded to decline 
supplemental jurisdiction over Barefoot‘s breach-of-contract 
claim, dismissing it without prejudice. Shortly thereafter, the 
District Court sua sponte dismissed the remaining counts of 
the counterclaim (for breach of contract and of fiduciary 
duty), which were also territorial-law claims over which it 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  
 The parties cross-appealed. Barefoot asks only that we 
reinstate its copyright claim. The defendants/counterclaimants 
limit their appeal to the tortious interference, breach of 
contract, and breach of fiduciary duty counterclaims.  
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review district court decisions regarding both summary 
judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim under the 
same de novo standard of review.  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 
318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009) (summary judgment); Santiago v. 
GMAC Mortg. Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005) 
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(motion to dismiss).  Summary judgment should be granted 
only when the record ―shows that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  While 
―[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all 
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor‖ in 
determining whether a genuine factual question exists, 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), 
summary judgment should not be denied unless there is 
sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the 
nonmovant. Id. at 249; Giles, 571 F.3d at 322.  To withstand a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ―a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‗state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.‘‖ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ 
U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
The doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938), applies to cases decided by the federal courts over 
what would be state-law claims if the Virgin Islands were a 
state.  Edwards v. Hovensa, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 360–61 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Thus we apply the rule of decision that the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court would apply in adjudicating issues of 
territorial law.  The Virgin Islands Code provides that ―[t]he 
rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of 
the law approved by the American Law Institute, and to the 
extent not so expressed, as generally understood and applied 
in the United States, shall be the rules of decision in the 
courts of the Virgin Islands in cases to which they apply, in 
the absence of local laws to the contrary.‖ 1 V.I.C. § 4.   
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III 
A 
 The District Court granted summary judgment and 
dismissed Barefoot‘s copyright claim on the ground that 
Barefoot did not own the copyright to the architectural plans 
at the time those rights were allegedly infringed, and that it 
thus lacks standing to assert a copyright infringement action.  
The court reasoned as follows.  When Milne originally 
created the copyrighted work, he was an employee of Village.  
Under the works-for-hire doctrine, Village is presumed to 
own the copyrights to works created by its employees during 
the course of their employment.  See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).  
Plaintiff concedes this much to be true, but argues that 
Village effectuated a transfer of the copyright in question to 
Barefoot in 1999, such that Barefoot was the rightful owner at 
the time that the alleged infringement began.  The District 
Court disagreed, concluding that there was no evidence to 
support such a transfer, and that Barefoot therefore had not 
raised a genuine question of fact as to whether it owned the 
copyright at the relevant point in time. 
 Ownership of a copyright is freely transferrable ―by 
any means of conveyance or by operation of law.‖ 17 U.S.C. 
§ 201(d).  However, a transfer (other than one by operation of 
law) ―is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a 
note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed 
by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner‘s duly 
authorized agent.‖ 17 U.S.C § 204(a).  No such writing 
existed in this case until the ―Memorandum of Transfer‖ 
dated September 9, 2008—nearly nine years after the alleged 
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assignment took place (October 5, 1999), and more than four 
years after this lawsuit was filed.  So the first question we 
must address is whether such a long-delayed memorialization 
can successfully validate a long-ago oral copyright transfer.  
 This being an issue of statutory interpretation, we 
begin with the text.  Section 204(a)—frequently referred to as 
the Copyright Act‘s ―statute of frauds‖—specifically 
contemplates a post-hoc ―note or memorandum of the 
transfer,‖ as distinct from an ―instrument of conveyance,‖ as a 
permissible means of satisfying the Act‘s writing 
requirement.  The ―note or memorandum‖ does not itself 
constitute the transfer; rather, the writing renders valid and 
enforceable in court a change in ownership that has already 
taken place.  See 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 
Nimmer on Copyright § 10.03[A][3] & nn.20–22 (Rev. Ed. 
2009).  Under the statute‘s plain terms it is clear that an oral 
transfer can be given legal effect by a subsequent signed 
writing. 
 Of course, even under this construction it is possible 
for a writing to be simply too far removed in time from the 
event it purports to memorialize, so that there can be no 
validation of the past event.  The Ninth Circuit so held in 
Konigsberg Int’l v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994), a case 
involving novelist Anne Rice‘s alleged oral agreement ―to 
sketch out a romantic melodrama involving a love triangle 
between a resurrected mummy, an English heiress and Queen 
Cleopatra,‖ and to license the story to Konigsberg to serve as 
the basis for various derivative works.  Id. at 356.  The 
alleged oral contract granted Konigsberg a two-year period to 
exploit its rights, with an option to extend.  The only extant 
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signed writing memorializing the contract, however, was a 
letter from Rice to Konigsberg‘s lawyer, sent after litigation 
had commenced.  The letter read, ―as far as I am concerned, 
these contracts, though never signed, were honored to the 
letter. . . .  [The licensees] got exactly what they paid for.‖  Id.  
Konigsberg sought to use this letter to prove that Rice had 
granted a license, but the court refused to credit that theory.  
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Kozinski argued that 
the writing requirement is designed to prevent an author from 
―giv[ing] away his copyright inadvertently,‖ to ―force[] a 
party who wants to use the copyrighted work to negotiate 
with the creator to determine precisely what rights are being 
transferred and at what price,‖ and to provide a ―guidepost for 
the parties to resolve their disputes.‖  Id. at 357 (quoting 
Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 
1990)).  These goals, according to the Ninth Circuit, are only 
served if the writing is ―executed more or less 
contemporaneously with the agreement‖ and is ―a product of 
the parties‘ negotiations.‖  Id.   
Konigsberg distinguished the Copyright Act‘s statute 
of frauds from its contract-law cousin (which can be satisfied 
by a letter like the one Rice wrote, see Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 133 & cmt. b) on the ground that in contract 
law, the statute ―serve[s] a purely evidentiary function—to 
prevent enforcement through fraud or perjury of fictitious 
agreements.‖  16 F.3d at 357.  By contrast, a copyright 
assignment is, under the terms of § 204(a), simply ―not valid‖ 
unless there is a writing.  Id.  According to the Ninth Circuit, 
an oral contract subject to the statute may be valid but 
unenforceable in court, but a copyright transfer cannot even 
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take place without a writing.  This reading of § 204(a) 
compelled the court to interpret the statutory requirements 
strictly, so as to demand substantial contemporaneity.  So 
construed, § 204(a) was not satisfied by ―a letter [that] was 
written three and a half years after the alleged oral agreement, 
a year and a half after its alleged term would have expired 
and 6 months into a contentious lawsuit.‖ Id.1 
 We consider this analysis unconvincing.  To begin, 
while the text of the statute (as we observed above) clearly 
allows for a subsequent writing to effectuate an earlier oral 
transfer, it does not specify a time period during which the 
writing must be consummated.  Indeed, it does not even 
impose a fuzzy standard like ―substantially 
contemporaneous.‖  The Ninth Circuit‘s decision to imply 
such a requirement appears to rest entirely on its assessment 
of the copyright statute‘s purposes, in contradistinction to 
those of the contract-law statute of frauds.  According to the 
Konigsberg court, the latter serves a ―purely evidentiary 
function,‖ while the former has the additional purpose of 
―enhanc[ing] predictability and certainty of ownership.‖  Id. 
(citations omitted).  However, it is not clear that this second 
goal is anything more than a rewording of the purpose of 
ordinary statutes of frauds.  Just as requiring a written 
contract prevents enforcement of a nonexistent obligation 
through the exclusion of fraudulent, perjured, or 
misremembered evidence, requiring a writing for enforcement 
of a copyright assignment ―enhances predictability and 
certainty of ownership‖ by preventing litigants from 
                                                 
1
 The court also observed that the letter was not a product 
of negotiations.  16 F.3d at 357. 
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enforcing fictitious ―agreements‖ through perjury or the 
testimony of someone with a faulty memory.  See Victor H. 
Polk, Jr. & Joshua M. Dalton, Equitable Defenses to the 
Invocation of the Copyright Act‘s Statute of Frauds 
Provision, 46 J. Copyright Soc‘y U.S.A. 603, 611 (1999).  
That is, the two statutes serve essentially identical purposes, 
even if some courts may have phrased those purposes so as to 
make them sound different.   
Furthermore, to the extent that the Ninth Circuit‘s 
argument hinges on a distinction between an oral copyright 
transfer not being ―valid‖ and an oral contract simply being 
unenforceable, it is a bit hard to discern the practical 
difference.  As leading commentators have observed, ―[a] 
contract is ‗valid‘ [only] insofar as it has legal operation and 
‗invalid‘ insofar as it has not,‖ 4 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on 
Contracts § 12.5 (rev. ed. 1997), meaning that a contract 
rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds is not actually 
―valid‖ in any meaningful sense.  See also id. at n.12 (―[I]t 
should not be said that the statute [of frauds] does not affect 
the ‗validity‘ of the contract, because validity cannot be 
separated from remedy.‖).  Accordingly, it is perfectly 
reasonable to read § 204(a) as allowing enforcement of oral 
agreements through the same sorts of later-drafted, informal 
writings that are universally held to satisfy the statute of 
frauds in the contract setting.   
 Other courts, including a differently constituted panel 
of the Ninth Circuit in a post-Konigsberg case, have reached 
that conclusion—and have done so in circumstances more 
closely analogous to our own than those presented in 
Konigsberg.  In Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424 
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(9th Cir. 1996), a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held 
sufficient a writing dated more than fourteen years after the 
oral transfer.  The plaintiff, Magnuson, was both CEO of the 
transferor corporation (Columbus Productions, Inc.) and the 
owner of the transferee firm (John Magnuson Associates), but 
he did not memorialize the change in copyright ownership at 
the time it took place.  The defendant in Magnuson‘s 
copyright infringement suit argued that the assignment was 
invalid and that Columbus therefore still owned the rights.  
(Columbus was no longer operating and had no ability to 
sue.)  The dissent took the position that Konigsberg 
controlled, id. at 1432 (Fernandez, J., dissenting), but the 
majority distinguished the case before it on the ground that 
―the problem with the writing in that case was not so much 
that it was not contemporaneous with the agreement but that 
it was ‗not the type of writing contemplated by section 204‘ 
because it ‗came far too late to provide any reference point 
for the parties‘ licensing disputes.‘‖  Id. at 1429 n.1 (majority 
op.) (quoting Konigsberg, 16 F.3d at 357).  This made a 
difference: in Magnuson there was no need for a ―reference 
point‖ to resolve any dispute, because no dispute existed: no 
one involved in the putative transfer contended that it had not 
occurred.  See id.  The Magnuson court found particularly 
compelling the reasoning of Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee 
Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations 
omitted): 
[S]ince the purpose of the provision is to protect 
copyright holders from persons mistakenly or 
fraudulently claiming oral licenses, the ―note or 
memorandum of the transfer‖ need not be made 
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at the time when the license is initiated; the 
requirement is satisfied by the copyright 
owner‘s later execution of a writing which 
confirms the agreement.  In this case, in which 
the copyright holder appears to have no dispute 
with its licensee on this matter, it would be 
anomalous to invoke this provision against the 
licensee. 
The Eleventh Circuit also follows the rule that an oral 
agreement is valid if it is later ratified in writing, see Arthur 
Rutenberg Homes, Inc. v. Drew Homes, Inc., 29 F.3d 1529, 
1533 (11th Cir. 1994), and has applied it to facts quite similar 
to those in the case before us.  In Imperial Residential Design 
v. Palms Development Group, 70 F.3d 96 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(per curiam), Imperial Residential Design drew up a set of 
floor plans for Regal Classic Homes.  One of Imperial‘s 
principals then orally transferred to Regal all of Imperial‘s 
rights in the design; both parties believed that the plan 
belonged solely to Regal.  Regal subsequently discovered a 
competitor, Palms Development Group, marketing similar 
plans, and sued for copyright infringement.  Palms defended 
on the ground that Regal did not own the copyright.  After the 
initial lawsuit had been filed (there were several iterations), 
Regal obtained a written agreement that it claimed 
memorialized the original oral transfer of Imperial‘s 
copyright.  The court decided that, at least in a case like that 
before it, in which the assignor and the assignee did not 
dispute ownership and in fact were both plaintiffs in the same 
infringement case, it would not demand a contemporaneous 
writing.  Id. at 99.  In so holding, the court reasoned that ―the 
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chief purpose of section 204(a) (like the Statute of Frauds) is 
to resolve disputes between copyright owners and transferees 
and to protect copyright holders from persons mistakenly or 
fraudulently claiming oral licenses or copyright ownership.‖  
Id.  Because there was no dispute between the original 
copyright holder and the putative transferee, the court thought 
that ―it would be unusual and unwarranted to permit a third-
party infringer to invoke section 204(a) to avoid suit for 
copyright infringement.‖ Id. (citing Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 
36). 
 We agree with the reasoning of Magnuson, Imperial, 
and Eden Toys.  At least where there is no dispute between 
transferor and transferee regarding the ownership of a 
copyright, there is little reason to demand that a validating 
written instrument be drafted and signed contemporaneously 
with the transferring event.  No one in the cases just cited (or 
in the case now before this Court) has ―giv[en] away his 
copyright inadvertently,‖ or lost his chance to negotiate, or 
been left without a ―guidepost‖ for resolving a dispute.  See 
Konigsberg, 16 F.3d at 357.  Nor are concerns regarding 
certainty compelling: none of the defendants in any of these 
cases thought that it owned a copyright, only to find out 
through litigation that its claim was invalid because of a snafu 
involving the written instrument.  All of them knew or should 
have known that they were at least potentially infringing 
someone’s copyright—even if they perhaps could not be 
precisely sure whose.
2
  Because none of the considerations 
                                                 
2
 The defendants in this case contend that they hold a valid 
license to make use of the plans that Milne and his associates have 
worked up, but we have no need to reach that argument. 
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driving Konigsberg‘s insistence on contemporaneity come 
into play in a case in which there is no dispute between 
transferor and transferee, we hold that a third-party infringer 
in such a case cannot evade liability by invoking § 204(a) and 
demanding a contemporaneously-drafted instrument. 
B 
 Resolving that legal question does not, however, 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Barefoot prevails here 
and that the District Court should be reversed.  For a writing 
to ―validate‖ a past transfer, the past transfer must have 
actually occurred.  See Magnuson, 85 F.3d at 1429 (observing 
that ―the district court made several factual findings that are 
not clearly erroneous indicating that Columbus did, in fact, 
transfer its copyright to John Magnuson Associates in the 
seventies‖); Imperial, 70 F.3d at 96 (―Both Wilson and 
McGuffie testified that Wilson then orally transferred to 
Regal all his company‘s rights in the Regency design and that 
both believed that the Regency plan was the sole property of 
Regal.‖); Rutenberg, 29 F.3d at 1530 (―It is uncontroverted, 
however, that Heise and Chrysalis entered into an oral 
agreement that Heise would prepare these plans for Chrysalis, 
and that the copyright in the ‗Verandah II‘ plan would be 
owned by Chrysalis.‖); Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 36 (holding 
that a later writing can validate an earlier transfer, but 
remanding to the district court for determination of whether 
―Paddington could orally or through conduct grant an 
exclusive license to Eden‖).  We agree with the District 
Court‘s conclusion that Barefoot has failed to raise a triable 
issue of fact as to whether the alleged 1999 oral transfer ever 
occurred. 
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 The purported transfer of Village‘s copyright interest 
here is in the nature of an assignment.  In contract law, ―[a]n 
assignment of a right is a manifestation of the assignor‘s 
intention to transfer it by virtue of which the assignor‘s right 
to performance by the obligor is extinguished in whole or in 
part and the assignee acquires a right to such performance.‖  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317(1).  Analogously, 
an assignment of a copyright ―is a manifestation of the 
assignor‘s intention to transfer [the copyright] by virtue of 
which the assignor‘s [copy]right . . . is extinguished in whole 
or in part and the assignee acquires [the copyright].‖  All that 
is required for the completion of an assignment is that the 
assignor ―manifest an intention to transfer the right to another 
person . . . . The manifestation may be made to the other or to 
a third person on his behalf and, except as provided by statute 
or by contract, may be made either orally or by a writing.‖  
Id. § 324.  No particular formality is required, except to the 
extent required by statute.  Id. cmt. a.  Thus, anyone with 
authority to convey Village‘s property to another3 could have 
                                                 
3
 The defendants argue that Milne lacked authority to 
effectuate the transfer, because such power was vested exclusively 
in Village‘s board of directors acting as a whole.  This argument 
lacks merit.  As an executive officer, Milne was an agent of the 
corporation and had the power to bind the corporation to contracts 
and to assign its assets.  See 2 William Meade Fletcher, Cyclopedia 
of the Law of Corporations §§ 434, 437 (rev. ed. 2006) (officers 
are agents of the corporation, whose powers are determined by 
agency law; ―[t]heir authority may be implied from their conduct 
and the acquiescence of the directors‖); Restatement (Third) of 
Agency § 2.01 & cmt. b (an agent has actual implied authority both 
―to do what is necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or 
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orally assigned the copyright to Barefoot by saying, ―Through 
me, Village hereby assigns you its copyright in the Bunge 
project design,‖ or other words to the same effect (provided 
that Village later backed up the oral statement with a writing).   
The complication in this case is that the copyright was 
allegedly assigned by Village, acting through Milne, and 
assigned to Barefoot, also acting through Milne.  Barefoot 
nevertheless insists that the transfer of rights occurred orally, 
on October 5, 1999, as the Memorandum of Transfer attests.  
With the issue so framed, we cannot conclude that the District 
Court erred in finding no evidence of a transfer.  Barefoot 
proffers three possible sources of such evidence, but none is 
availing. 
 First, Barefoot argues that the Memorandum itself ―is 
the best evidence of assignment,‖ because both Milne (an 
officer, director, and shareholder of Village) and Speer 
(Village‘s president, as well as a director and shareholder) 
signed a document confirming that the assignment took place.  
We disagree.  The idea of a memorandum ―validating‖ an 
earlier copyright transfer depends on the original transferring 
event actually having transpired.  In each of the cases cited 
above for the proposition that a later writing can confirm an 
earlier oral grant, there was evidence of this crucial historical 
fact extrinsic to the writing.  None of those courts confronted 
                                                                                                             
perform an agent‘s express responsibilities‖ and ―to act in a 
manner in which an agent believes the principal wishes the agent 
to act based on the agent‘s reasonable interpretation of the 
principal‘s manifestation in light of the principal‘s objectives and 
other facts known to the agent‖). 
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a case in which it was argued that the same document both 
proved that an oral transfer occurred and gave legal effect to 
that otherwise unenforceable promise.  We do not think that a 
―note or memorandum of transfer‖ can simultaneously serve 
each of these purposes.  If it could, a distantly post-hoc 
writing would be capable of rendering enforceable a (possibly 
fictional) ―transfer‖ that purportedly took place years or 
decades earlier but for which there is no independent 
evidence.  This would enable a perjured or misremembered 
writing to override actual historical events.  Suppose, for 
instance, that O gave A a written document conveying his 
copyright in 2005.  Later, out of spite or faulty memory, O 
drafts a document purporting to validate a 2004 oral transfer 
of the same copyright to B, even though there is no evidence 
that this assignment actually took place.  If the memorandum 
to B were enough to prove that the event occurred, then for 
practical purposes A never owned the copyright despite 
holding an instrument of conveyance:  B holds a document 
showing that he took ownership in 2004 and that O therefore 
did not have any copyright to assign in 2005.  If B‘s 
document is enough on its own to prove that the oral transfer 
happened, A has no recourse, as there is in all likelihood no 
way for him to prove that such an event did not transpire.  
Thus B would be able to sue A for infringement despite the 
fact that O never actually said anything to him about the 
copyright until after he had already given the transferring 
instrument to A.  This is the kind of result that the writing 
requirement is intended to avoid.  We should not construe § 
204(a) in a way that would permit such an outcome.  If 
Barefoot is to get past summary judgment it must present 
evidence, apart from the Memorandum of Transfer itself, that 
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is sufficient to allow a conclusion that the October 5, 1999 
oral assignment actually occurred.  
 The second proffered bit of evidence for the 
assignment is a pair of checks (one from Village to Barefoot, 
the other—which appears to have been scratched out, though 
not voided—from Barefoot to Village) that, according to 
Barefoot, represent consideration from Barefoot to Village for 
the transfer of the project in question.  However, nothing in 
the checks themselves or the relevant deposition testimony 
indicates that the checks constituted compensation for the sale 
of any copyright.  Reading Speer‘s testimony, one gets a 
vague sense that the checks were part of the process of 
shuffling things around when Village was getting out of the 
practice of architecture and Barefoot was starting up, but 
there is nothing to link the checks to the copyright.  Even if 
the checks were part of a general transfer of the project from 
one entity to the other, such an exchange would not have 
―necessarily required a copyright transfer,‖ as plaintiff 
asserts.  Barefoot might (for instance) have subcontracted to 
work on the project without buying the copyright, or it might 
have just exploited the copyrighted material with no right to 
do so, hoping that it wouldn‘t be sued.  The business 
arrangement isn‘t spelled out anywhere, and the record 
contains nothing to show that Barefoot bought the copyright.  
Thus the checks themselves carry little evidentiary weight.  
More to the point, even on the most charitable interpretation, 
the checks simply are not evidence upon which a jury could 
conclude that Village orally assigned its copyright to Barefoot 
on October 5, 1999. 
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 Barefoot‘s third attempt at showing that the transfer 
occurred hinges on the contract signed by the owners and 
Barefoot in August 2000.  As just noted, the mere fact that 
Barefoot had taken over work on the project does not imply 
that Village had orally transferred its copyright on October 5, 
1999.  And while the contract stipulates that Barefoot ―shall 
be deemed the authors and owners of their respective 
Instruments of Service and shall retain all common law, 
statutory and other reserved rights, including copyrights,‖ that 
provision is meaningless if Village (and not Barefoot) owned 
the copyright all along.  The copyright provision does not 
prove, or even suggest, that Barefoot ever owned the 
copyright.  It certainly is not evidence that the particular oral 
transferring event in question actually took place. 
 Other than the Memorandum of Transfer (which as we 
have said cannot stand on its own), none of the proffered 
evidence, such as it is, would permit a jury to conclude that 
an oral transfer took place on October 5, 1999, as the 
Memorandum would have it and as Barefoot has argued.
4
  
                                                 
4
 We note that while Barefoot has not so argued, it is likely 
possible for a copyright transfer to be implied from conduct and 
then later validated in writing.  Eden Toys suggested this 
possibility, see 697 F.2d at 36, and generally speaking the intent to 
transfer a right may be manifested through conduct.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19 (―The manifestation of 
assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words 
or by other acts or by failure to act.‖) (emphasis added); 6 Am. 
Jur. 2d Assignments § 83 (―Under the appropriate circumstances, a 
right may even be assigned without the execution of a formal 
assignment.‖).  The Copyright Act does not foreclose this 
22 
 
Summary judgment was therefore appropriate, and we will 
affirm the District Court. 
IV 
 Before the case reached the summary judgment stage, 
the District Court dismissed the defendants‘ counterclaim for 
tortious interference with contractual relations pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6).   
A 
The relevant provisions of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, §§ 766 and 766A, have not been abrogated by local law 
and thus control our analysis.  1 V.I.C. § 4.  Section 766 
requires, as an element of the cause of action, that the 
defendant cause a third party not to perform its obligations 
under a contract.
5
  The District Court dismissed the 
                                                                                                             
possibility: it provides that copyrights ―may be transferred in 
whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of 
law.‖  17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (emphasis added).  Plaintiff here has 
not, however, taken this route, and we will not consider whether it 
would have been availing. 
We also observe that it might be possible for a court to 
recognize equitable exceptions to § 204(a)‘s writing requirement.  
See generally Polk & Dalton, supra.  But again, Barefoot has not 
advanced such an argument. 
5
 Section 766 (―Intentional Interference with Performance 
of Contract by Third Person‖) reads in full: 
One who intentionally and improperly interferes 
with the performance of a contract (except a 
contract to marry) between another and a third 
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counterclaim on the ground that it does not allege that anyone 
failed to perform any contract. Defendants/counterclaimants 
do not dispute this conclusion; rather, they argue that the 
District Court erred in relying solely on § 766, to the 
exclusion of § 766A.   
Section 766A (―Intentional Interference with 
Another‘s Performance of His Own Contract‖) does not 
require a failure to perform:  
One who intentionally and improperly interferes 
with the performance of a contract (except a 
contract to marry) between another and a third 
person, by preventing the other from 
performing the contract or causing his 
performance to be more expensive or 
burdensome, is subject to liability to the other 
for the pecuniary loss resulting to him. 
The plaintiff can only recover, however, if the defendant‘s 
interference made it more expensive or burdensome for the 
plaintiff to perform.  Distinguish the two sections thusly: § 
766 allows a plaintiff to recover if a third party fails entirely 
to perform (because such nonperformance actually harms the 
plaintiff, whereas simply making a third party‘s life more 
difficult does not necessarily injure anyone else), while § 
                                                                                                             
person by inducing or otherwise causing the third 
person not to perform the contract, is subject to 
liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting 
to the other from the failure of the third person to 
perform the contract. 
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766A allows the plaintiff to recover if he himself was forced 
either to fail to perform under a contract or to perform under 
more expensive or burdensome circumstances (because the 
plaintiff‘s nonperformance or extra expense actually harms 
him). 
The nature of the counterclaim makes clear that the 
defendants were attempting to invoke expense and delay, 
rather than nonperformance, as the origin of their damages.  
They allege that Barefoot ―engaged in a course of action and 
communications to the Commissioner of the Virgin Islands 
Department of Planning and Natural Resources‖ that ―was 
designed and calculated to delay and interfere with the 
permitting process for the construction‖ project, that in fact 
Barefoot‘s conduct did cause delays in permitting and 
construction, and that these delays led to monetary damages.  
The defendants emphasize that the gravamen of their harm is 
the delay in permitting and the consequent delay in 
construction.  This allegation fulfills the elements of § 766A.
6
   
B 
Barefoot does not dispute this conclusion on the 
merits.  Instead it contends that the defendants‘ § 766A 
argument is waived because they did not adequately raise it in 
                                                 
6
 We note that because a plaintiff can only recover under § 
766A if the defendant‘s actions made the plaintiff‘s own 
contractual obligations more difficult or expensive, any relief 
obtained via this counterclaim should be limited to those parties 
whose own performance was hindered by the alleged delays in 
permitting. 
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the district court.
7
  We disagree.  While waiver ordinarily bars 
raising new arguments for the first time on appeal, this rule 
―is one of discretion rather than jurisdiction,‖ Selected Risks 
Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 1983), and it may 
be ―relaxed whenever the public interest . . . so warrants.‖  
Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617, 620 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977).  The 
waiver rule applies with greatest force ―where the timely 
raising of the issue would have permitted the parties to 
develop a factual record.‖  In re Am. Biomaterials Corp., 954 
F.2d 919, 927–28 (3d Cir. 1992).  The public interest is better 
served by addressing § 766A than by ignoring it.  The waiver 
rule serves two purposes: ensuring that the necessary 
evidentiary development occurs in the trial court, and 
preventing surprise to the parties when a case is decided on 
some basis on which they have not presented argument.  See 
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941).  Neither of 
these aims would be furthered by invoking waiver here.  The 
posture of the case vitiates the first: evidence is irrelevant to a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and we are presented only with the 
purely legal question whether Count V of the counterclaim 
states a cause of action.  And there can be no plausible claim 
of surprise or prejudice, because although the defendants‘ 
district court briefing invoked the wrong definition of the tort, 
the counterclaim itself alleges damages resulting from delay 
and added expense.  It thus plainly means to invoke the § 
                                                 
7
 The defendants‘ district court briefing on the subject 
quoted only cases requiring nonperformance, as per the § 766 
definition. See Pourzal v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 60229, at *7–8 (D.V.I. 2006) (requiring nonperformance); 
Gov’t Guar. Fund of Fin. v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 452 
(D.V.I. 1997) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766). 
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766A definition of the tort.  We do not deem the § 766A 
argument waived. 
C 
Barefoot next argues that because the counterclaim 
was not filed until March 9, 2007, the applicable two-year 
limitations period bars claims that accrued before March 9, 
2005.  See 5 V.I.C. § 31(5)(A).  Because we are considering a 
motion to dismiss, our review is restricted to the face of the 
counterclaim. See, e.g., Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 
135 (3d Cir. 2002); Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 
1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978) (―If the [statute of limitations] bar 
is not apparent on the face of the complaint, then it may not 
afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6).‖). The Virgin Islands applies the discovery rule to 
tort suits, such that the statute of limitations is tolled ―when 
the injury or its cause is not immediately evident to the 
victim.‖  Joseph v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 867 F.2d 179, 182 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  The date of discovery is not evident from the face 
of the counterclaim, which avers only that the defendants 
―discovered recently‖ that the plaintiffs had engaged in a 
tortious course of action.  Thus the pleading does not reveal 
when the limitations period began to run, and the statute of 
limitations cannot justify Rule 12 dismissal. 
D 
Because the tortious-interference counterclaim 
survives all the challenges that Barefoot has raised against it, 
we will vacate the District Court‘s dismissal. 
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V 
 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the District Court, on 
its own motion, dismissed the counterclaims for breach of 
contract and of fiduciary duty, on the ground that no federal 
law claims remained in the case and that continuing to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the territorial law 
claims was unwarranted.  The owners argue that jurisdiction 
is nonetheless proper on the basis of diversity of citizenship, 
28 U.S.C. § 1332: Bunge and Friedberg, the only 
counterclaimants with an interest in the breach claims, are 
California citizens, and Barefoot is a Virgin Islands citizen.
8
   
Generally speaking, the dismissal of the complaint 
―will not preclude adjudication of a counterclaim over which 
the court has an independent basis of jurisdiction.‖  Rengo 
Co. Ltd. v. Molins Mach. Co., Inc., 657 F.2d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 
1981).  It is unimportant for this purpose that Roberts and 
Springline (both Virgin Islands citizens) are listed in the case 
caption (thus apparently destroying the complete diversity 
required by Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 
(1806)), because we are focused on whether jurisdiction 
exists with respect to the individual counterclaim, rather than 
with respect to the case as a whole.  Had they filed first, the 
owners could have invoked § 1332 to bring their breach 
claims in federal court in the first instance, and Barefoot 
could have filed its causes of action as counterclaims.  As 
things actually transpired, the owners were forced to file their 
                                                 
8
 Each of these counterclaims also places more than the 
$75,000 jurisdictional threshold in controversy.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a). 
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breach claims as compulsory counterclaims, because they 
arose out of the same ―transaction or occurrence‖ as 
Barefoot‘s complaint.9  Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).  The owners 
should not be deprived of a federal forum, to which they 
otherwise would have been entitled, because Barefoot‘s initial 
complaint named a non-diverse defendant who has no part of 
the owners‘ claims (except perhaps as a witness). 
This conclusion does have an unusual consequence 
with respect to the tortious-interference counterclaim 
(discussed in Part IV, supra) asserted by all four defendants.  
Suppose that the owners had initiated the lawsuit by filing a 
complaint invoking diversity jurisdiction and asserting only 
the territorial law causes of action that presently remain 
before this Court.  Rule 24(b)(1)(B) would appear to permit 
Roberts and Springline to intervene in order to assert their 
tortious interference claims against Barefoot.  Those claims 
would need a basis of jurisdiction, and the only possibility 
(there being no diversity or federal question) would be 
                                                 
9
 To be deemed part of the same ―transaction or 
occurrence,‖ a claim need only ―bear[] a logical relationship to‖ 
the subject matter of the complaint.  Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp., 
576 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir. 1978).  Such a logical relationship 
exists where separate trials on each of the claims would ―involve a 
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the 
courts.‖ Id.  ―In short, the objective of Rule 13(a) is to promote 
judicial economy, so the term ‗transaction or occurrence‘ is 
construed generously to further this purpose.‖  Transamerica 
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 292 F.3d 
384, 389 (3d Cir. 2002).  This is clearly the case here, and there is 
no dispute that the counterclaims are compulsory. 
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supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  But in a 
case in which the district court‘s jurisdiction is based upon 
diversity, § 1367(b) denies the district courts supplemental 
jurisdiction ―over claims by persons seeking to intervene as 
plaintiffs under Rule 24 . . . when exercising supplemental 
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the 
jurisdictional requirements of‖ the diversity jurisdiction 
statute.  The upshot is that if the owners had filed first, 
Roberts and Springline could not have piggybacked on their 
co-plaintiffs‘ diversity action.   
Yet in the case that is actually before the Court, 
Roberts and Springline have not been made parties under any 
of the Rules subject to § 1367(b)‘s jurisdiction-stripping 
provision
10
; rather, they are defendants and Rule 13(a) 
compulsory counterclaimants.  See United Capitol Ins. Co. v. 
Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488, 492–93 (4th Cir. 1998) (―[T]he 
limitation of § 1367(b) applies only to plaintiffs’ efforts to 
join nondiverse parties.‖)  As the Fourth Circuit observed, the 
limits on supplemental jurisdiction were ―designed to prevent 
plaintiffs from circumventing the requirements of diversity.‖  
Id. at 493.  But ―because defendants are involuntarily brought 
into court, their joinders and impleaders were not deemed as 
suspect as those of the plaintiff, who is master of his 
complaint.‖  Id.  Roberts and Springline did not voluntarily 
avail themselves of the federal forum; they were named as 
defendants and were forced to raise their compulsory 
counterclaims or lose them.  Accordingly all four 
defendants/counterclaimants can use the breach of contract 
and of fiduciary duty causes of action (which are properly 
                                                 
10
 That is, Rules 14, 19, 20, and 24. 
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before the court pursuant to Rule 13(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332) 
as anchor claims to which they may attach their resurrected 
tortious-interference-with-contract cause of action under the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute.  Federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction thus attaches to all three territorial-law 
counterclaims.  
VI 
 To sum up:  We will affirm the District Court‘s 
judgment as regards the summary judgment motion on the 
copyright claim. We will vacate the District Court‘s Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal of the tortious-interference-with-contract 
counterclaim and its dismissal of the breach of contract and of 
fiduciary duty counterclaims.  We will remand those three 
counterclaims for consideration on the merits. 
